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1. Introduction
The residential sector is the third largest energy
consuming sector in the EU, accounting for 24.8% of
final consumption (Eurostat, 2016). Space and water
heating comprise 67% and 14% of residential energy
use, respectively (E.C., 2011). As a result, improv-
ing the energy efficiency of residential buildings pro-
vides an opportunity for policy to reduce a nation’s
carbon footprint and for households to save money
on their energy bills and improve the comfort of their
homes. This is particularly important given the Eu-
ropean Union mandate to reduce energy use by 2020
(European Parliament and the Council of the Euro-
pean Union, 2012) and the Paris Agreement’s empha-
sis on the need to reach peak greenhouse gas emissions
as soon as possible as a means of helping to achieve
the limitation of global warming below 2◦C (United
Nations, 2015).
Energy efficiency retrofitting is subject to certain
market failures, most notably transaction costs and in-
formation asymmetries. As such, many governments
provide financial incentives for households to engage in
energy efficiency retrofitting works. In order to max-
imise the impact of such subsidies, the structure of
incentives must be attractive to home owners. This
paper engages with the identification of the most pre-
ferred structure of financial incentive to home own-
ers if they were to undertake retrofitting works. Us-
ing stated preference data to model individual pref-
erences, this paper is concerned with identifying the
variation in preferences for different structures of fi-
nancial incentive in Ireland and how these preferences
vary across the population.
A fully state-financed roll-out of energy efficiency
retrofit technologies is unlikely to be feasible due
to the economic implications of such an investment.
Instead, many governments provide schemes to in-
centivise retrofitting at the household level. This
is an attractive means of driving investments in en-
ergy efficiency in residential buildings as households
also benefit from such investments, in addition to the
state. Examples of these incentives include the UK’s
recently concluded Green Deal financing scheme,
France’s cre´dit d’impoˆt de´veloppement durable (Sus-
tainable Development Tax Credit) or Germany’s KfW-
Effizienzhaus financing scheme. In Ireland, the Better
Energy Homes scheme provides approximately 35%
of the costs of retrofitting for certain energy effi-
ciency retrofit measures. This is delivered in the form
of a cash rebate following the completion of works.
This is supplemented by the Better Energy Warmer
Homes scheme, which provides the full cost of spe-
cific retrofitting works for recipients of specific welfare
supports.
The design of incentives for residential energy effi-
ciency retrofitting at the household level raises some
concerns surrounding the accessibility of incentives for
different groups. Energy efficiency retrofitting results
in substantial private gains to the household in the
form of lower energy bills, increased comfort and envi-
ronmental improvements (Aravena et al., 2016; Clinch
and Healy, 2001; Gillingham et al., 2009), along-
side improved health outcomes (Howden-Chapman
et al., 2012; Mar´ı-Dell’Olmo et al., 2016) and in-
creased property values (Brounen and Kok, 2011; Hy-
land et al., 2013; Fuerst et al., 2015). As such, if
general taxation is used to subsidise retrofitting in-
vestments, distributional concerns will arise if certain
socio-demographic groups are more or less likely to
privately accrue these benefits as a result of the intro-
duction of subsidies.
Using survey data, we examine whether there exist
more or less preferred options to certain demograph-
ics of home owners, relative to the status quo. The
findings of this analysis provide an insight into and an
interpretation of potential distributional and welfare
implications of changes to the structure of this finan-
cial incentive. We find that, relative to the status quo,
the alternatives of a property tax reduction or an up-
front discount would be less preferred by respondents
of certain characteristics. The alternatives of a tax
credit scheme to supplement loan financing and the
ability to make repayments on the cost of works via
an employer are less favoured by all respondents. The
least preferred option is that of no financial incentive
to retrofit, although the strength of this distaste varies
by characteristics of respondents, most notably across
age categories.
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows.
Section 2 provides a discussion of literature in the area.
Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 outlines the
methodological approach, while Section 5 outlines and
discusses the results before Section 6 concludes.
2. Relevant Literature
Previous research in the area is discussed in three
sections. Firstly, we discuss research outlining why
preferences may vary toward government subsidies in
general. This is followed by a discussion of research
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on different forms of government incentives for im-
proved energy efficiency. Finally, we discuss literature
of particular relevance to energy efficiency retrofitting.
Preferences toward different structures of financial
incentive may vary due to issues of distributional eq-
uity. For example, low-income households are less
likely to be able to avail of subsidised costs for en-
ergy efficiency measures. This arises not only from a
decreased ability to fund these reduced costs, due to
a tighter budget constraint combined with a greater
number of competing necessity goods, but also in-
creased liquidity restraints stemming from a restricted
access to credit and loans (Camprub´ı et al., 2016).
Similarly, discount rates vary across the income distri-
bution. The decision to invest in energy efficiency
retrofit measures can be seen as an inter-temporal
consumption decision in which individuals reduce con-
sumption today by investing, in order to increase fu-
ture consumption of the benefits outlined above. The
degree to which households are willing to allocate their
consumption over time is dependent on how much
they value current over future consumption. How-
ever, an inverse relationship between discount rates
and income has been found, with those from low in-
come households tending to have higher discount rates
than those from higher income households (Hausman,
1979; Train, 1985; Lawrance, 1991). The present
value of future energy efficiency benefits is therefore
lower for lower-income households. As such, low-
income households will be less likely to respond to
incentives for energy efficiency renovations. Incentives
which involve the delaying of consumption are hence
biased in favour of those with higher incomes.
With regard to energy efficiency policies,
Markandya et al. (2015) provide a discussion of
the types of policy measures which can be used to
foster energy efficiency, dividing them into three areas.
“Command-and-control” policies mandate minimum
levels of energy performance, usually implemented via
building codes and standards. “Price instruments”
aim to encourage or discourage certain decisions
through indirect changes to prices, such as through
taxes on or permits for consumption, tax deductions,
tax credits, subsidies, rebates or preferable loans for
energy saving decisions. “Information instruments”
aim to mitigate the market failure of information
asymmetry, with examples including smart-metering,
energy auditing and energy labelling. This paper is
concerned with price instruments and the impact of
a change from the current cash rebate scheme to
promote retrofitting in Ireland to other price instru-
ments. The literature on price instruments promoting
desirable activities cover issues such as tax credits
and subsidies. For example, Borenstein and Davis
(2016) follow Crandall-Hollick and Sherlock (2012)
and Neveu and Sherlock (2016) by investigating the
distributional impacts of ‘clean energy’ tax credits
in the US for activities such as weatherising homes,
installing solar panels and buying hybrid or electric
vehicles. Borenstein and Davis (2016) found issues
regarding distributional equity, with the bottom three
income quintiles receiving just 10% of all credits and
the top quintile receiving about 60% of all credits.
West (2004) finds that direct subsidies on new
cars would be regressive, while accelerated vehicle
retirement programs would be progressive. Distante
et al. (2016) examine the distributional impact of a
renewable energy subsidy in Italy, concluding that
the subsidy acted as a tax on the middle-class, with
welfare losses occurring in the second, third and
fourth income quintiles
Looking specifically at policies regarding energy ef-
ficiency retrofitting, the issue of the accessibility of fi-
nancial incentives to retrofit across sub-groups of the
population is investigated by Camprub´ı et al. (2016),
who take a theoretical approach to examine, ex-ante,
the impact of policies. Camprub´ı et al. (2016) identify
inequalities across socio-demographics in that greater
barriers to retrofitting are faced by low-income groups,
renters and the elderly, inequalities that may be exac-
erbated by public policies which do not provide free
and/or targeted services to the most affected groups.
Neuhoff et al. (2012) examine the up-take of various
types of incentives in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands
and the United States but do not examine whether
any of these subsidies might be more or less preferred
by households. Collins and Curtis (2017b) briefly dis-
cuss distributional impacts of tweaks to the Irish cash
rebate system to improve per household optimization
of energy efficiency improvements under the Better
Energy Homes scheme. Collins and Curtis (2017b)
speculate that a focus on retrofit measures providing
greater value for money to the grant provider might
lead to a prioritisation of rural homes, relative to urban
homes. This is because insulating cavity walls, which
are more prevalent in rural areas, provides greater
value for money than insulating solid walls, which are
more prevalent in urban areas.
We add to the literature on preferences towards in-
centives to retrofitting across the population of Ireland
by investigating how changes to the structure of incen-
tives may not be equally preferred across sub-groups
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of the population. This complements the literature
examining the distributional impacts of different in-
centive structures.
3. Data
To explore preferences for certain forms of subsi-
dies, we analyse stated preference data provided by
the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland from a
pooled cross-sectional survey of home owners in Ire-
land. The survey was undertaken in December 2014
and December 2016. In both instances, a face-to-face
survey was conducted in respondents’ own homes, us-
ing a computer-aided personal interviewing approach.
The 2014 and 2016 surveys were conducted on sam-
ples of 659 and 650 respondents, respectively, repre-
sentative of region and socio-economic status, con-
sisting only of owners of houses (i.e. no owners of
apartments or renters were included) who were the
primary or joint decision-maker responsible for energy
usage and energy improvement related decisions. Re-
sponses were collected as part of a wider survey on
retrofitting. Some respondents were precluded from
analysis for not providing full information to certain
questions, leaving a sample of 645 from each survey,
leading to a total sample of 1,290 respondents.
The primary interest of this analysis concerns stated
preferences toward the structure of financial incen-
tives. Respondents were verbally provided with the
following question and set of response choices, with
surveyors asking respondents for their first, second and
third preferences:
Different incentive options may be consid-
ered to encourage investment in energy effi-
ciency measures. For example if you under-
took to complete an attic insulation or other
measure you might receive a financial incen-
tive in one of the following forms. Which of
these would you prefer?
1. Reduced property tax based on a better
energy efficiency rating
2. Tax credits for each year of the loan term
3. Cash back once the work is complete
4. Ability to pay through your employer via
your salary/wages (along the lines of the
bike to work scheme where you save on the
purchase price with tax relief)
5. A discount on the cost of work upfront
6. None
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Prop.
Reduced property tax based on a better energy efficiency rating 145 0.11
Tax credits for each year of the loan term 93 0.07
Cash back once the work is complete 482 0.37
Ability to pay through your employer via your salary/wages 65 0.05
A discount on the cost of work upfront 437 0.34
None 68 0.05
Gender
Male 615 0.48
Female 675 0.52
Age
18 - 35 229 0.18
36 - 45 320 0.25
46 - 55 271 0.21
56 - 65 232 0.18
65+ 238 0.18
Location
Urban 771 0.60
Rural 519 0.40
Social Class
AB 190 0.15
C 755 0.59
DEF 345 0.27
Ownership
Own outright 493 0.38
Own with mortgage 797 0.62
Property Type
Detached 559 0.43
Semi-detached 527 0.41
Terraced 204 0.16
Availed of current grant in the past
No 1,091 0.85
Yes 199 0.15
Total Observations 1,290
The stated first preference of respondents towards
structures of financial incentives provides the variable
of interest for our analysis, as will be discussed in Sec-
tion 4. The order of preferences for each survey and
the pooled sample are presented in Figure 1. The to-
tal number of preferences varies as some respondents
did not express a second and/or third preference. As
can be seen, a similar pattern in preferences can be
seen in both surveys, with the order of the popularity
of preferences remaining the same. Cash back once
the work is complete is expressed most often as the
most preferred form of financial incentive. This is fol-
lowed closely by an upfront discount on the cost of
work. This is perhaps surprising as, although both
options are quite similar, the former requires a larger
degree of liquidity in order to first cover total costs,
relative to the liquidity required to cover a partial cost.
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Figure 1: Ranking of preferences for suggested incentive structures
Reduced property tax is seen to be third-most popu-
lar choice, although the popularity of this option ap-
pears to have declined quite strongly between 2014
and 2016. Tax credits for each year of a loan term are
the next most-preferred option and, finally, the ability
to make repayments through an employer is the least
popular choice. The popularity of the option to make
repayments via an employer has increased, however,
from 2014 to 2016. Overall, while the order of pop-
ularity of each choice has remained the same, there
has been a noticeable reduction in the popularity of
the first three options, i.e. cash back after works,
an upfront discount and reduced property tax, while
the popularity of repayments through an employer has
risen.
Other information collected about respondents in-
cludes socio-demographic characteristics, property
type, ownership, location and whether they have
availed of a grant for retrofitting in the past. Socio-
demographic information comprises gender, age cat-
egory and social class. As discussed in Section 2,
preferences may vary due to variation in impacts of
policies across these characteristics. Social class is
categorised according to the Central Statistics Office
socio-economic groupings, where ‘A’ comprises “Em-
ployers and managers”, ‘B’ is described as “Higher
professional” and ‘C’ as “Lower professional”. ‘D’ is
described as “Non-manual”, ‘E’ as “Manual skilled”
and ‘F’ as “semi-skilled” and in this case also in-
cludes Farmers. Property type is divided into three
types of houses, these being detached houses, semi-
detached houses and terraced houses, while location
is divided between urban and rural dwellings. These
characteristics may affect preferences as property val-
ues may affect preferences for incentives related to
property tax. Ownership is categorised as those who
own their homes with a mortgage and those who own
their homes outright and may affect preferences due
to the ability and/or appetite to take on credit. De-
scriptive statistics for the pooled dataset are presented
in Table 1.
4. Econometric Approach
This research concerns the identification of home
owners’ preferences toward different structures of fi-
nancial incentive to retrofit. We use a multiple regres-
sion to gain an understanding of how these preferences
vary across characteristics of the population. We de-
sign a discrete choice model in which the dependent
variable represents the probability that a home owner
possesses a stated first preference for a specific struc-
ture of financial support. Since our dependent variable
represents an unordered choice that can be one of the
six options discussed in Section 3, we use a multino-
mial logit model. A number of papers follow a similar
approach to modelling issues surrounding space heat-
ing (Braun, 2010; Couture et al., 2012; Michelsen and
Madlener, 2012).
The multinomial logit model estimates the prob-
ability that a respondent will choose one of the al-
ternative incentive structures as their first preference,
relative to the base outcome of the status quo. The
multinomial logit model assumes that errors are inde-
pendently and identically distributed according to the
type I extreme value distribution, commonly referred
to as the Gumbel distribution. A multinomial probit
model was also considered but this did not cause any
significant changes to the estimates of the model. In
the case of the multinomial logit, the probability that
home owner i chooses option j (j=1,2,...,J) is speci-
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fied as follows:
P (ISj) = Pi,j =
exp(βjxi)
1 + ΣJk=1exp(βkxi)
(1)
where ISj represents incentive structure j and Pi,j
the choice probability. The vector xi represents the
characteristics of respondent i discussed in section 3,
while β represents the vector of estimated coefficients.
To interpret the results of the analysis, relative risk ra-
tios are calculated. Relative risk ratios are calculated
as the exponent of the coefficient and represent the
relative probability of an outcome, relative to the base
outcome, corresponding to a unit change in the pre-
dictor, holding all else constant.
In a multinomial logit model the ratio of two prob-
abilities, for example (Pi,j=1/Pi,j=2), is assumed not
to depend on any alternatives other than j = 1 and
j = 2, irrespective of the other alternatives avail-
able. As such, the model assumes what is termed
independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Mc-
Fadden (1973) advises that multinomial logit models
“should be limited to situations where the alternatives
can plausibly be assumed to be distinct and weighed
independently in the eyes of each decision maker”. For
our empirical application it is not unreasonable to as-
sume that households possess a clear distinction in
preferences between potential structures of financial
incentives for retrofitting measures.
Variations in preferences may be caused by various
theoretical mechanisms and/or combinations thereof.
The random utility framework provides a commonly
used theoretical approach in the energy efficiency lit-
erature, with examples including Gro¨sche and Vance
(2009), Michelsen and Madlener (2012) and Collins
and Curtis (2017a). In this framework, home owners
make decisions to invest in certain energy efficiency
renovations based on a number of factors. Households
decide to invest on the condition that they believe it
is the optimal time to retrofit, i.e. when net present
value is maximised at the time of investment. Ex-
pectations regarding the optimal time to retrofit are
based on current and future expectations surround-
ing the characteristics of their home, capital costs,
the cost of energy consumption, energy savings ac-
crued from renovating, other non-monetary benefits
and costs, such as search costs, comfort and health
gains, etc. and the regulatory environment. This reg-
ulatory environment includes the level and structure of
grant aid and building regulations, which could impact
on the costs of retrofitting and the supply of contrac-
tors. Home owners will choose to invest if, among
other things, the structure of financial incentive is not
expected to be amended to a more preferable struc-
ture for the individual.
Prospect theory might also provide a potential ex-
planation for variations in preferences. In particular,
prospect theory might hypothesise a preference toward
a cash rebate over structures which seek to reduce
expenditures, such as reduced property tax, upfront
discount or tax credit system. While the net outcome
might be the same in each case, the net perceived
benefit may be greatest in the case of a cash rebate.
Consumers are found to value gains and losses differ-
ently. While some consumers may treat each option
as a net outcome (Johnson and Thaler, 1985), others
may treat them as segregated gains and losses, both of
which provide decreasing marginal changes to utility
but with losses providing greater marginal changes to
utility than equivalent gains (Kahneman and Tversky,
1984). If the utility accrued from a rebate of the cash
grant exceeds the dis-utility accruing from the addi-
tional payment of the value of the cash rebate then a
cash rebate system can be seen as more preferable.
5. Results and Discussion
Estimated results are presented in Table 2. The
model presented here provides an insight into how
preferences toward the structure of financial incentives
to retrofitting vary by socio-demographic characteris-
tics. We cannot say for certain that changes will lead
to lesser or higher uptake of retrofitting incentives as
we do not know the strength of preferences, how well
the stated preferences of respondents reflect their true
preferences or how each structure could impact on in-
dividuals’ investment decisions.
As the econometric model is comprised solely of
categorical independent variables, the estimated con-
stants reflect the preferences of those in our reference
categories. In this case, the reference category is com-
prised of males in the ‘18-35’ age category, those living
in detached houses in urban areas who own their house
outright, those in the ‘AB’ social class and who have
not availed of a grant for retrofitting works in the past.
The reference category does not possess a statistically
significant preference toward either the reduced prop-
erty tax or upfront discount alternatives, relative to
the status quo. The remaining three alternatives are,
however, much less preferred by the reference cate-
gory. The option of no incentive is found to be the
least likely option to be chosen, with a relative risk
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Table 2: Homeowners’ likelihood of possessing a preference for incentive structures other than the status quo, reported using relative
risk ratios
Base category = Status quo (“Cash back once work is complete”)
“Reduced property tax
based on a better
energy efficiency rating”
“Tax credits for
each year of
the loan term”
“Ability to pay
through your employer
via your salary/wages”
“A discount on
the cost of work
upfront”
“None”
Constant 0.603 0.218*** 0.165*** 1.072 0.0442***
(0.240) (0.109) (0.0957) (0.318) (0.0377)
Gender (ref = Male)
Female 0.574*** 0.867 0.665 1.064 1.069
(0.112) (0.198) (0.180) (0.144) (0.292)
Age (ref = 18 - 35)
36 - 45 1.120 1.359 2.170** 0.950 1.327
(0.347) (0.443) (0.839) (0.196) (0.866)
46 - 55 0.971 1.059 1.384 0.958 2.123
(0.319) (0.378) (0.597) (0.206) (1.352)
56 - 65 1.217 0.839 0.491 1.147 3.650**
(0.413) (0.337) (0.298) (0.277) (2.321)
65+ 1.047 0.206*** 0.212* 0.996 8.556***
(0.383) (0.121) (0.184) (0.253) (5.580)
Location (ref = Urban)
Rural 0.682* 0.952 0.914 0.873 0.542**
(0.141) (0.242) (0.270) (0.126) (0.164)
Social Class (ref = AB)
C 0.826 1.281 0.970 0.769 1.624
(0.224) (0.442) (0.356) (0.150) (0.861)
DEF 0.824 0.894 0.442 1.067 2.250
(0.259) (0.389) (0.247) (0.242) (1.273)
Ownership (ref = Own outright)
Own with a mortgage 0.979 0.790 0.835 1.136 1.239
(0.220) (0.209) (0.289) (0.187) (0.397)
Property Type (ref = Detached house)
Semi-detached 0.705 1.149 1.636 1.071 0.617
(0.152) (0.307) (0.530) (0.163) (0.187)
Terraced 0.449** 0.961 1.132 0.767 0.389**
(0.142) (0.336) (0.489) (0.151) (0.175)
Availed of grant in the past (ref = No)
Yes 1.431 1.111 0.646 0.574*** 0.320**
(0.333) (0.340) (0.277) (0.112) (0.156)
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Relative risk ratios are calculated as the exponents
of the estimated coefficients of the multinomial logit model.
ratio of 0.0442, meaning that the reference category
are over twenty times less likely to choose this option
than the status quo. The options of a tax credit for
each year of a loan term and the ability to make repay-
ments on costs via an employer were also found to be
less preferred to the status quo, reporting estimated
relative risk ratios of 0.218 and 0.165, respectively.
5.1. Socio-demographics
While the results presented in Table 2 show no sta-
tistically significant preferences with regard to social
class, significant variation is found regarding the age
of respondents. Those in the ‘65+’ category are signif-
icantly less likely to prefer incentive structures involv-
ing tax credits for each year of a loan term or making
repayments through an employer, relative to the ‘18-
35’ category. Relative to those aged between 18 and
35, those aged 65 or older report relative risk ratios
of 0.206 and 0.212 for the tax credit and repayment
through an employer alternatives, respectively. It is
not surprising that respondents in the ‘65+’ category
are less likely to prefer an incentive structure where
repayments on the costs of work are made via an em-
ployer. This is because members of this age category
are more likely to be out of the workforce due to retire-
ment and therefore unable to avail of the scheme. By
contrast we see that those in the ‘36-45’ age category,
an age category where one would expect the majority
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to be employed in the labour market, are significantly
more likely to prefer this incentive scheme, relative to
the ‘18-35’ category, reporting an estimated relative
risk ratio of 2.17.
Furthermore, the aversion to tax credits is likely due
to retirement from the labour market and thus lower
incomes. Those in the ‘65+’ category are more likely
to be in receipt of a lower income due to retirement
and/or reliance on pension income. In this case, the
income of these respondents is likely to give rise to
lower tax liabilities and, as such, tax credits may be
less attractive due the greater likelihood of potential
tax credits exceeding tax liabilities. The results there-
fore suggest an aversion to incentive schemes which
involve tax credits or making repayments through an
employer among older age cohorts, which is likely ex-
plained by the life cycle of labour market participation
and earnings.
While the reference category is found to be very
unlikely to express a preference for the option of no
incentive to retrofit, those in the ‘56-65’ and ‘65+’
age categories are significantly more likely to choose
such an option. Table 2 reports estimated relative
risk ratios of 3.65 and 8.556 for respondents in the
‘56-65’ and ‘65+’ age categories, respectively. There
exist a couple of possible explanations for this trend
in preference toward the no incentive option. Firstly,
those in these older age categories will naturally pos-
sess shorter future lifespans and thus will possess less
time to accrue the benefits of engaging in retrofitting
works. Those who are therefore not interested in en-
gaging in retrofit works might prefer state expenditure
to be used elsewhere as they would not stand to gain
from the availability of such an incentive. This expla-
nation would appear to be justified by the increasing
relative risk ratio as one moves from the ‘56-65’ to
the ‘65+’ age category. Secondly, older people in Ire-
land are found to prioritise environmental protection
less than younger age groups and that environmen-
tal concern is found to decline from the ‘35-44’ age
category onward (Motherway et al., 2003). As con-
cern for the environment falls, older people may be
less likely to see de-carbonisation of the built environ-
ment as an area of priority for policy might therefore
be less likely to see the presence of financial incentives
as necessary. They might thus believe that there are
other areas where state funds could be better spent.
As such, older age groups may be more likely to pre-
fer a situation where financial incentives were not on
offer to retrofit. It is therefore clear that stated pref-
erences towards the structure of financial incentives
vary considerably across age categories.
5.2. Ownership and history of retrofitting
The results presented in Table 2 show that there is
no significant relationship between type of ownership
of a property and the likelihood of expressing a pref-
erence for any specific incentive structure. However,
respondents’ history of retrofitting is an important
determinant of such a preference. Those who have
retrofitted through the scheme in the past are found
to be 0.574 times as likely to express a preference for
an upfront discount as for a cash rebate, relative to
those who have not. People who have retrofitted in
the past via the cash rebate scheme are less likely to
have liquidity constraints which would prevent them
from paying the full cost of works upfront as they have
been able to do so in the past.
As discussed in Section 4, prospect theory provides
a potential explanation for why the status quo option
of a cash rebate may be preferred to an upfront dis-
count. As those who have retrofitted via the scheme
in the past have experienced the segregated gain of
the rebate, the estimated preference is consistent with
prospect theory. Similarly, those who have availed of
the grant scheme in the past are even less likely to
express a preference for no incentive. As those who
have availed of the grant scheme in the past natu-
rally possess more information regarding the benefit
of retrofitting it is likely that, as a result, they un-
derstand better the benefits of such an incentive and
are thus less likely to advocate a no incentive option.
We also cannot preclude the possibility that those who
have retrofitted in the past may be more likely to suffer
from status quo bias, which hypothesises a dispropor-
tionate preference for the status quo among individu-
als (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988).
5.3. Location and property type
Rural respondents are significantly less likely than
urban respondents to express a preference toward ei-
ther the reduced property tax or no incentive options
over the status quo of a cash rebate. All else equal, ru-
ral respondents possess relative risk ratios of choosing
the reduced property tax and no incentive options of
0.682 and 0.542, respectively. However, with regard
to the alternative incentive structures, the relative risk
ratios for rural respondents remain insignificant. Sim-
ilarly, Table 2 shows that, relative to respondents who
are owners of detached houses, those who own ter-
raced houses are significantly less likely to prefer a
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reduced property tax or no incentive structure, report-
ing relative risk ratios of 0.449 and 0.389, respectively.
Again, no significant relationship is found with regards
to owners of terraced houses for the remaining alterna-
tive incentive structures. Finally we see that no signif-
icant preferences for an alternative incentive structure
are found for owners of semi-detached houses, relative
to detached houses.
These findings suggest that owners of terraced
houses and rural respondents possess similar prefer-
ences. Both are less likely to prefer the option of ei-
ther a reduced property tax based on a better energy
efficiency rating or no financial incentive to retrofit,
relative to the status quo. Both owners of terraced
houses and rural respondents also possess no statis-
tically significant preferences for the remaining alter-
natives relative to the status quo. These preferences
are likely to operate through the same mechanism. It
is likely that respondents who live in rural or terraced
homes reside in less valuable properties than those
who live in urban houses and/or detached or semi-
detached houses. As such, they are likely to possess
relatively lower property tax liabilities. Any reduction
in property taxes based on a better energy efficiency
rating would therefore lead to smaller savings in ab-
solute terms than the reduction in property tax for
those with more valuable properties and thus higher
property tax liabilities. This incentive scheme could
therefore be considered regressive, as those with more
valuable properties would accrue greater subsidisation
than those with less valuable properties for any energy
efficiency works undertaken. For those with less valu-
able properties, it is therefore not surprising to find a
distaste for a reduced property tax incentive structure.
Finally, it is not surprising that both groups also
prefer the status quo to the no incentive option as it
is generally more preferable to receive grant aid than
not, conditional on respondents placing value on a
state-sponsored retrofitting incentive.
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications
Improving the energy efficiency of the residen-
tial building stock is a stated policy goal in Ire-
land. As such, policy-makers use various instru-
ments to help stimulate improvements in energy effi-
ciency. In Ireland, the Better Energy Homes scheme,
a price instrument used to incentivise retrofitting at
the household level, currently comprises a cash re-
bate to home owners following the completion of
retrofitting works. This paper considers whether alter-
ations to this structure might induce greater levels of
retrofitting throughout the residential sector. Such al-
terations may, however, have positive and/or adverse
impacts across segments of the population of home
owners.
We add to the literature by investigating the pref-
erences of Irish house owners toward different financ-
ing structures. We apply a multinomial logit to a
pooled representative survey, examining stated prefer-
ences towards different incentive structures, relative
to the status quo. This is used to identify socio-
demographic groups which are more or less likely to
prefer alterations to the structure of financial incen-
tives offered by the state to promote residential energy
efficiency retrofitting. We find that, relative to the
status quo, the alternatives of a reduced property tax
based on improved energy efficiency ratings or an up-
front discount on the cost of works are less preferred
by respondents possessing certain characteristics. The
alternatives of a tax credit scheme to supplement loan
financing and the ability to make repayments on the
cost of works via an employer are less favoured by all
respondents. The least preferred option is that of no
financial incentive to retrofit, although the strength of
this distaste varies by characteristics of respondents,
most notable across age categories.
The results of this research provide certain policy
implications. The findings suggest that the most pre-
ferred option of the choice set presented to respon-
dents is the status quo, which comprises a cash re-
bate to home owners after the completion of works.
This is followed closely by the alternative of an up-
front discount, with only those who have engaged in
retrofitting works in the past expressing a preference
for the status quo over the upfront discount. The op-
tion of reduced property tax based on an improved en-
ergy efficiency rating would be less preferred by those
living in less valuable properties. Similarly, while a tax
credit or repayment via an employer system is found
to be generally less preferred by the reference group,
this distaste is even stronger among older age cate-
gories. As a result, the status quo remains the most
preferred option of the choice set presented. As such,
on the basis of the first preferences expressed by home
owners, the findings of this analysis would point to a
recommendation not to alter the structure of the fi-
nancial incentive on offer. The authors acknowledge
that other options exist outside of this choice set that
may be more preferred but may not have been con-
sidered for this survey. As such, the status quo is not
8
necessarily the ‘best’ option but is the most preferred
alternative within the choice set presented to respon-
dents.
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